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Abstract Railway transportation system is a critical sector
where design methods and techniques are defined by inter-
national standards in order to reduce possible risks to an
acceptable minimum level. CENELEC 50128 strongly rec-
ommends the utilizationoffinite statemachines during system
modelling stage and formal proof methods during the verifi-
cation and testing stages of control algorithms.Due to the high
importance of interlocking table at the design state of a sig-
nalization system, the modelling and verification of inter-
locking tables are examined in this work. For this purpose,
abstract state machines are used as a modelling tool. The
developed models have been performed in a generalized
structure such that the model control can be done automati-
cally for the interlocking systems. In this study, NuSMV is
used at the verification state. Also, the consistency of the
developedmodels has been supervised through fault injection.
The developed models and software components are applied
on a real railway station operated by Metro Istanbul Co.
Keywords Model checking  Abstract state machines 
Interlocking
1 Introduction
The importance of railway transportation is increasing day
by day as the world becomes more populated. European
Rail Infrastructure Masterplan (ERIM) Final Report states
that the traffic growth forecast for the period of 2006–2020
is 34 % for the passenger traffic and 57 % for the freight
traffic. It is also reported that the tackling all infrastructure
issues would require about 200 billion euros for the entire
ERIM network and about 60 billion euros for the six
ERTMS corridors [1]. Such an increasing level of traffic
congestion and need for infrastructure reveal many new
topics of research in this area.
The interlocking is a subsystem that avoids conflicting
movements of vehicles by adjusting the routes. The safety
critical software of the interlocking system is generally
composed of two different parts: generic application and
specific application. The generic application part is usually
designed with the general structure. On the other hand, the
specific application part is obtained based on the site
topology using this developed general application compo-
nents. Certification stage of a railway signalization project
generally includes this specific application part because
general application part has been already certified for one
time only. At this point, interlocking tables are taken as a
reference in order to obtain specific application from gen-
eral one.
In general, an interlocking table is a list which includes
all possible routes at the signalization system, and it defines
the situations of the signalling components in order to open
the routes safely. Sometimes the design of the interlocking
table is a difficult process for complicated field topologies.
A very slight failure means that a route will be opened in a
different condition than it should be. This could lead to
many possible different dangerous situations including
derailment or accident. For all these reasons, the inter-
locking table have to be verified. CENELEC EN 50128
strongly recommends the use of formal methods for SIL4
safety level in Table A-4 such that model checking is listed
among those formal methods.
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The advantage of model checking is to detect the fail-
ures during the design stage. This positive aspect makes it
possible to identify and correct these failures which would
be very hard or even impossible to rectify during the design
stage. On the other hand, Simulation methods could also be
considered as another option for the verification. However,
some studies have revealed that there is a residue risk of
not being able to detect all the probable failures through
simulation [2].
Many studies can be found in the literature regarding the
design of railway signalling and interlocking systems
through the use of formal methods. Winter designed a
model through CSP (Communicating Sequential Processes)
formal modelling language and performed the model
checking through FDR (Failures-Divergences Refinement)
[3, 4]. Similarly, Simpson presented some models for
British Railway Systems in accordance with GDL (Geo-
graphic Data Language) notation as CSP, and utilized FDR
as the model checking software [5]. In a further study,
Winter formed a model through ASM (Abstract State
Machine) notation which is a similar language to Robinson
and state-transition diagrams. She performed the model
check through NuSMV [6]. It has been maintained that
ASM notation has a more comprehensible expression than
models performed through CSP regarding the system
structure and performing state transitions with dynamic
properties through the same notation [7, 8]. In another
study, the model was formed through GCL (Guarded
Command Language) notation and modelled through CSP
for the correspondence of the processes [9]. CPN
(Coloured Petrinet) was used in the modelling of the
interlocking system formed in Anunchai State Railway of
Thailand format, and Panthong station was used as the
exemplary system [10]. CPN models are distinct from Petri
Net models as the tokens have specific properties [11].
Distinct from the other studies carried out, a general
modelling structure concerning the general properties of
station topology and interlocking table has been formed in
this study. A generalized software base design has also
been performed to be able to automatically check this
model through NuSMV software. A general structure of the
interlocking system has been analysed, and a general ASM
model structure has been obtained. At the same time,
conversion systematic has been revealed so that the ASM
model of the interlocking table can be used with NuSMV
software. In this way, it has become possible to establish an
infrastructure that can enable the testing of interlocking
table automatically.
The study consists of four sections. Section 2 defines the
basic definitions of model checking, and Sect. 3 mentions
the model checking of the interlocking table on the basis of
railway station operated by Metro Istanbul Co. Finally, the
paper is concluded in Sect. 4.
2 Model checking modelling
Recently, model checking was put forth as a result of
studies carried out by Edmund M. Clarke and Allen
Emerson as well as through J.P Quielle and J.Sifakis
independently [12, 13]. As a formula, with M a Kripke
structure and f a temporal logic, model checking is defined
as the study of all s states that are s := f in M structure [14].
It is possible to express the behaviour of a system with a
modelling technique such as petri nets, state-transition
diagrams or abstract state machines (ASM). As complex
topologies are not applicable in practice due to the problem
of state explosion, modelling the system behaviour as
unsophisticated as possible is very important [15]. Differ-
ent solutions for the state explosion problem have been
offered in literature [16, 17]. On the other hand, forming
the models in a simplest way as possible is always a big
advantage in industrial applications. Hence, the possible
solutions can be achieved easily and system requirements
can be identified accurately.
States are the set of values which are the result of
functions. Functions are split into distinct groups based on
their interrelations and assessments. ‘‘Static function’’ has
an assessment is for static functions, ‘‘dynamic function’’
has an assessment that could vary based on the model and
‘‘external function’’ has an assessment that may change as
a result of external factors independent from the model.
Transitions define how dynamic functions will vary
while going from one state to another. Such operations can
be conditioned through transition rules in ASM. In addi-
tion, transitions are realized in a synchronized way con-
currently based on the transition rules.
Updating Rule Enables the (f, (v1,…,vn)) state to be
updated according to the v value.
Conditioning Rule If ‘‘cond’’ condition, defined as logic,
is true, Rt is applied, if it is not true, then Re is valid
If cond then Rt else Re endif
Forall Rule If the logic ‘‘cond’’ condition is true for any
v 2 D, R is verified for v values
Forall v in D with cond do R
After forming the model of the system, the requirements
to be ensured and the propositions to be used for super-
vising the possible system failures are represented through
temporal logic formulae [18].
Computational tree logic (CTL) is a form of temporal
logic to express temporal logic formulae which can be
checked by model checking software. CTL formula
involves temporal expressions, with u and W being atomic
propositions, X u (next u), u U W (u atomic proposition is
valid until W), G u (u is always globally valid) and F u (u
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is valid in the future). Boolean logic operators like :, ^, _,
which means, respectively, ‘‘not’’, ‘‘and’’, ‘‘or’’, ‘‘if’’, ‘‘if
and only if’’ are included. In addition to these, path
quantifying operators are also defined, which are ‘‘A’’ (for
all probable paths) and ‘‘E’’ (for some probable paths). For
further details regarding CTL formulization, it is recom-
mended that the reader goes through referred studies [19].
3 Model checking of an urban railway
interlocking system
Interlocking system is the core subsystem of railway sig-
nalling systems such that it defines the exact conditions of
the field equipment in order to manage the vehicle move-
ments safely. For detailed information about railway sig-
nalization systems refer to [20]. In this work, the
considered system is an urban interlocking system that is
operated under double-track operation such that each track
is operated exclusively in one direction. In this context, the
safety rules that cover the predetermined conditions of the
blocks, points and signals within the system are examined.
The examined set of conditions are directly linked with the
elements contained by the desired route, system topology
and states of the routes previously opened. It is obvious that
interlocking system structures may vary depending on
countries, operating companies, topology and different
purposes of use but the basic safety rules remain the same
everywhere. This study concentrates on these basic safety
rules such that it aims to introduce a new model checking
strategy by introducing a core model using the most
existing elements in any urban interlocking system.
Three distinct elements have been taken into consider-
ation in the modelling phase. These elements are topology,
interlocking table and train motion. While the topology
model includes the states and positions of the blocks, points
and signals, the interlocking table model comprises the
basic requirements for opening all the possible routes. On
the other hand, the train motion model represents the
vehicle movement according to the signalization system.
A railway station, operated by Metro Istanbul Co., is
taken as a reference for this study. The layout of the station
is given Fig. 1. The station topology includes blocks,
points and antennae. Route inquiries are transmitted to the
interlocking system through antennae by the conductors.
Signals can be categorized into three, which are straight
line, vertical line and side line. A straight line indicates that
the train goes along the route straightly, while a vertical
line shows that train transitions are not allowed. Finally, a
side line informs that the route is formed in such a way that
the train diverges over the point. The positions of the points
vary depending on the route. The track circuits are posi-
tioned following the signals in order to get the information
if a vehicle occupies the corresponding block or not. Here
expressing the interlocking table perfectly is of vital
importance.
Here the modelling is initiated by taking the static
structure of the system as a reference. This structure is
designed as static functions in ASM model in such a way
that a subordinate space for all kind of elements is identi-
fied. It is also important to note that the interlocking table is
identified when all the elements of the system are totally
functional. Here the mechanical or electrical failure cases
are ignored while forming the system model.
Track: {Trackx, Track1, Track11, Track2, Track21}
– TrackName: {TCx, TC1, TC11, TC2, TC21}
– Point:{Pointx, Point1, Point 11, Point2, Point 21}
– PointName:{Px, P1, P11, P2, P21}
– PointPosition:{Normal, Inverse}
The accepted case is that the positions of these points




























Fig. 1 Layout of the railway station operated by Metro Istanbul Co.
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Naming for the blocks is incorporated into the model as
a static function, while occupation is handled as a dynamic
function. As the states of the signals vary depending on the
opened routes and the occupation of the rail blocks, they
are depicted as static functions.
The starting positions of the trains have been set ran-
domly and route requirements have also been chosen ran-
domly, ensuring the scanning of all possible states. The
names and directions of the trains are defined as static
functions, while the position of the train is identified as a
dynamic function. External functions have been used for
nondeterministic behaviours mentioned.
static function TrackID: Track ? TrackName
dynamic function Occ: Track ? Boolean
dynamic function SigColour: Signal ? SignalColour
external functionTrainRequestID:Train ? AntennaName
external function Train_InitSituation: Train ?
AntennaName
The base of the model is formed upon the completion of
the functions. The structure that ensures the model to
evolve (transitions between the states) can be made pos-
sible through transition rules as mentioned earlier. Identi-
fication of the transition rules has ensured signalling,
checking the points and modelling the train motion,
depending on the conditions of the interlocking system.
One part of the interlocking table designed for railway
station is provided in Table 1.
Route column includes the route number, and it also
refers to starting track circuit and the ending track circuit of
that specific route. Blocks indicate which blocks are
included in that route. Point and signal columns define the
proper situation of the points and the signals for that
specific route. As it is obviously seen in the ‘‘signals’’
column, these conditions are not deterministic. Further-
more, the counter routes column is to point out the routes
which of them should be locked, while the route which is
taken into account is assigned. Signals are redefined as R
(red), G (green) and Y (yellow) which replaces vertical,
horizontal and side lines, respectively, to make the
table more understandable.
Routes and points are not locked at the initial stage. All
the signals are defined as vertical line (red), not allowing
any passage. Route requirements and starting states are
identified randomly in the model.
The system elements are assigned a value based on the
interlocking table. For instance, if a train requires the route
R1 and if the requirements for the opening of the route
have been fulfilled, (which means the rail blocks are
available and no counter route is locked), then that par-
ticular route is locked. After having the route locked, points
are arranged and locked. Afterwards, the signal state
changes according to the interlocking table. Also, the
motion of the train is determined based on the signal and
point states and the moving direction.
if TrainFrontSituationID(Train1) = TC21
then if TrainDirection(Train1) = Right
then if (SigColour(Signal21) = Green or  
SigColour(Signal21) = Yellow)
then if (PointPosition(P2) = Normal and  
PointPosition(P21) = Normal 
then TrainFrontSituationID(Train1) := TC2
One of the primary aims of this study is to establish
relations between ASM and NuSMV notations. Static and
dynamic functions defined in ASM model can be expressed
through variables defined, respectively, as FROZENVAR
and VAR in NuSMV. Definition sets and value sets where
functions are defined can be identified as the subobjects of
the parent objects which are named as MODULE in
NuSMV. Parent objects serve as structures through which
several elements can be defined. Here transition rules are
depicted as ‘‘next’’ and initial states are stated as ‘‘init’’.
The relation between ASM and NuSMV is given over point
model in Table 2.
Requirements include propositions that are necessary for
the system to provide. In order to define the requirements,
CTL notation has been preferred in this study. The CTL
formula given below has been used to check the collisions
of the trains.
SPEC NAME Collision: = AG!(Train1. Situa-
tionID = Train2. SituationID | Train1. NextSituationID =
Train2. SituationID |Train1. SituationID = Train2. NextSi
tuationID);
Also, fault injection technique has been utilized, and a
failure has been intentionally incorporated into the system
in order to test the accuracy of the introduced model. For
this purpose, the state without ‘‘Route1’’ from the counter
routes has been injected as a failure in the interlocking
table for Route9. A counter example for this situation is
presented below. The ASM and NuSMV code are pre-
sented below.
Specification AG! ((Train1. SituationID = Train2. Sit-
uationID | Train1. NextSituationID = Train2. SituationID)
| Train1.SituationID = Train2.NextSituationID) is false.
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Table 1 Designed interlocking table
Route Blocks Points Signals Counter routes





































R6: TC21 ? TC2 TC21, TC2 P21: Normal
P2: Normal
S21: G All/{R6,R1,R3}
























R10: TC2 ? TC21 TC2, TC21 P21: Normal
P2: Normal
S2: G All/{R10, R1, R3}
R11: TC11 ? TCx TC11, TCx Px: Inverse
P1: Normal
P11: Normal
S11: G All/{R11, R6, R10}
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Collision of trains simply means that two trains are on
the same rail block at the same time. As can be seen from
the above ASM or NuSMV code, although Route1 and
Route9 are counter routes, and not defined in the inter-
locking system, it has been able to lock Route9, while
Route1 is already locked. This error has resulted with the
case that trains can be on the same rail block in State 1.5.
Derailment is another condition that should be checked.
If a route is opened for one of the trains but point positions
are not correctly arranged, then a possible derailment can
happen. CTL formularization identified for the detection of
such cases is as follows:
SPEC NAME Derailment1: = AG! (Train1.Situa-
tionID = TC1 & Train1.Direction = Right &
Pointx. Position = Inverse);
SPEC NAME Derailment2: = AG! (Train1. Situa-
tionID = TCx & Train1. Direction = Right &
Pointx. Position = Normal);
The requirement Derailment2 states that when the train
is on TC21 rail block with the direction toward right, point
Px has been set normal as a failure or not is checked out.
Probable failures have been incorporated into the system
through fault injection technique. It has also been checked
if the model, developed structurally, is able to detect the
failures or not. Thus, system reliability has been boosted.
The specification and its counter example in NuSMV
structure are provided below.
Specification AG! ((Train1.SituationID = TCx &


































As a result of counter example analysis, it can be seen
that when the train is in TCx position, point Px comes to the
normal position. This situation would lead to derailing of
the train. In this situation, the train arrives TCc but could
not proceed to the next state Px because of the position
misalignment of point Px. This case clearly shows that the
problem lies with Route1. Here the consistency of the
generated model is inspected, and the adequacy of it is
shown with a counter example and fault injection method.
It is seen that the developed models can be easily used in
verification of interlocking tables.
4 Conclusion
This study reveals the modelling of interlocking system
and the physical structures of the urban railway system. It
also presents how the safety requirements can be stated in
temporal logic notation. The modelling has been performed
through ASM notation, and CTL temporal logic expres-
sions are used to express the system requirements. Unlike








static function PointID : 
Point --> PointName
PointID(Pointx):=Px











next(Data)  :=  case cond  :
upd 
TRUE  :  Data 
esac
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other researches, random failures have been incorporated
into the model through fault injection rationale, and it has
been expected that model detecting element is to identify
the relevant failures. Here the introduced models have been
carried out for a railway station operated by Metro Istanbul
Co. The interlocking table has been created for the corre-
sponding station, and the accuracy of it has been checked it
out by the introduced models via NuSMV.
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